tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587723021467018459.post3064381999946572987..comments2018-12-17T07:33:24.492-07:00Comments on The Tactical Wargamer: The Question of Battle Doctrine and National Mythology in the Second World WarM.Doroshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09742262581616285671noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587723021467018459.post-32519458388494877522016-05-04T17:52:35.886-06:002016-05-04T17:52:35.886-06:00gamesquad comments continued:
Michael Dorosh - 2...gamesquad comments continued:<br /><br /><br />Michael Dorosh - 25 Mar 09 11:26 <br />Forgot to come back to this - could the Canadian Corps have taken Vimy Ridge in the face of a properly executed 'elastic defence'? It's a good question. I don't think it would have been any more effective against the sledgehammer that the Canadian Corps threw against the ridge that day - looking at photos of the objective, I'm not sure the terrain would have permitted an effective elastic defence in any event - if the goal was to push the Germans off the summit, such a defence might have succeeded in preventing a rout such as occurred in which the Germans streamed back down the rear of the hill later, but I think the Canadians would have seized the high ground and moved the yardsticks at least to the top of the hill with great effort. <br /><br />Michael Dorosh - 12 Aug 10 20:07 <br />I was just reading sparty's excellent ASL blog here and was prompted to link back to this entry. As I revisit the comments, I see we discussed Vimy Ridge a year ago. As it turns out, I visited Vimy this summer, and at the visitor centre found a good book written about the German Army's defence of the ridge, from the time they first captured it from the French, to the time they lost in in 1917. <br /><br />Perhaps needless to say, the "standard" Canadian telling of the battle is a bit one-sided, and indeed, the Germans did intend to defend the ridge with a more elastic defence. In fact, they realized that their defence there was inadequate and had hoped to do much more than they were able to do. The usual Canadian histories don't hint at this, naturally enough. <br /><br /><br />M.Doroshhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09742262581616285671noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587723021467018459.post-87877156448623288282016-05-04T17:52:11.234-06:002016-05-04T17:52:11.234-06:00Gamesquad comments continued:Rindis - 19 Feb 09 10...Gamesquad comments continued:Rindis - 19 Feb 09 10:36<br />“Do you think that increased preparation time will always favour the defender, out of curiosity?"<br /><br />Yes, if the defender is concentrating on the correct place. Given an equal amount of time and effort on each side, on the same battleground, preparation should favor the defender. I would say WWI on the western front was this principle writ large as the amount of time and effort invested in the trench systems did an excellent job nullifying the efforts expended in preparing the offense with troop concentrations and artillery barrages.<br /><br />With Kursk, that's the entire point, the Germans probably had a better chance in May than in July. They prepared the offensive with further troops and new equipment, but it wasn't worth the time spent because the Soviets understood what an obvious target the salient was.<br /><br />In Normandy we spent a lot of effort convincing the German high command that the invasion would come at the more obvious Pas de Calais, so that efforts were largely spent in the wrong area.<br /><br />I've generally thought that Rommel had the right idea. Put the bulk of the defenses up front where they don't have to move under Allied air superiority, and contain the invasion until the local maneuver reserve can move up to eliminate the beachhead. Of course, even without the need to wake up Hitler to get the orders to move, our air superiority may not have allowed the panzer divisions enough mobility to do their job. But it was probably the best plan for the materials Rommel had to work with. It was effectively the same type of strategy as the limes that defended the Roman Empire for nearly three centuries. <br />Michael Dorosh - 19 Feb 09 22:26 <br />Okay, what about:<br /><br />Vimy Ridge? It seems to me that despite the amount of time the defenders invested in concrete blockhouses and artillery preparation, the attackers were heavily favoured due to the tactics employed there - and surprise was not one of them.<br /><br />What about:<br /><br />Iwo Jima? Even with months to prepare underground caverns and despite what I presume were generous supplies of ammunition and being nearly impervious to the preliminary bombardment by air and sea, the defenders were unable to prevent the loss of the island. <br /><br />Rindis - 20 Feb 09 12:55 <br /><br />First rule: There are no absolute rules.<br /><br /><br /><br />Iwo Jima's the easier case. Given the preponderance of manpower (on and off the front lines) and material resources we had in excess of the Japanese, I don't see any way to successfully defend an island. In fact, I don't think there's any way to do it without local naval superiority. (Think of how different things could have gone if you assume a naval situation analogous to the opening part of the Guadalcanal campaign.) In this case, the amount of preparation for the Japanese is fixed (but very large), while the ongoing capability for naval bombardment, air support, fresh troops, fresh supplies, evacuating the wounded, et al allows for a fair amount of preparation when you look at each part of the invasion in microcosm, and adds up to enough to overcome the initial advantage.<br /><br />The point is that if both sides spend roughly the same effort preparing for the same battle, the side on defense gains.<br /><br />A quick look at the Battle of Vimy Ridge (sorry, but WWI is well outside my expertise) suggests that in the end the Canadians spent more effort preparing as they endeavored to use to the utmost all that had been learned in the field of effective tactics over the past two years, while Germans failed to rework their defenses in accordance to their new theories. Or do you think the Candian Corps could have won in the face of a properly executed 'elastic defense' that the German Army had been switching to? <br />M.Doroshhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09742262581616285671noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8587723021467018459.post-3314257426816883042016-05-04T17:51:08.890-06:002016-05-04T17:51:08.890-06:00The posting originall appeared at gamesquad.com. T...The posting originall appeared at gamesquad.com. The comments there read: <br /><br />British Tommy - 08 Feb 09 09:22 <br />A very well written and researched article Michael. <br />Michael Dorosh - 08 Feb 09 09:58 <br />Thanks - but be better if the pictures would come up...my server must be acting up. I could add them as thumbnails at the end of the entry, but I like putting them right into the article as it breaks up the text a bit more... <br />[hirr]Leto - <br />Good stuff Mike. I just started reading your blog, and will now be a weekly reader.<br /><br />Cheers!<br /><br />Leto <br />Scott Tortorice - 09 Feb 09 21:34 <br />You had better stop writing this stuff, Mike. You're making the rest of us look bad....<br />Michael Dorosh - 09 Feb 09 21:37 <br />Given your rout of me in our last game of chess, I think only I will ever know what true humiliation is... <br />Rindis - 10 Feb 09 09:49 <br />Once again, you've covered your topic well enough, and thoroughly enough, that it's hard to say anything. <br />Michael Dorosh - 10 Feb 09 16:26 <br />But that's why I always ask a question at the end.... <br />Rindis - 12 Feb 09 12:38 <br />Yes, and I've had a difficult time coming up with an answer. :P Sticking mostly with, "Is it not eminently sensible to fight only when you are prepared?":<br /><br />One of the things that makes warfare such a fascinating chaos generator is that there is no rule that is always applicable.<br /><br />Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the latter than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never. -Napoleon<br /><br />A common thread between almost all the great commanders of history is their willingness to take chances, to 'push their luck', and gamble on the outcome. To follow your thesis, this works, because they picked the right time and place to catch their opponent unprepared.<br /><br />Which brings me to my point; the time to attack when not prepared is when the enemy is less prepared than you are.<br /><br />The Battle of Kursk is a very good example of this. The Germans were quite well prepared in July of 1943, and had been planning the operation for months. The problem was, so had the Soviets. I've pointed out before that Moves once ran an article where the various versions of Citadel proposed for the preceding months (with appropriate adjustments to German and Soviet strengths) were gamed and showed the Germans did better with less preparation, and fewer delays.<br /><br />I'd like to see a more thorough analysis, and one that takes advantage of post-Cold War scholarship, but the fact is that the defense is traditionally stronger than the offense. Therefore, taking time to prepare favors the defender. <br />Michael Dorosh - 18 Feb 09 16:42 <br />Yes, the axiom about tactics being the art of avoiding a fair fight - whoever said it (and I dearly wish I knew) - seems apt.<br /><br />Interesting points about CITADEL. While the Germans were less prepared, though, weren't the Soviets, as you progress earlier in time? The weather also became problematic as you moved forward in July because of the rains IIRC, and the mud. <br /><br />Do you think that increased preparation time will always favour the defender, out of curiosity? It seems to have at Kursk. I am researching the Normandy landings right now. I always thought Rommel was a bit of a nitwit for championing the linear defence but you know, he was actually keenly studying what happened at Sicily, Salerno and Anzio.<br /><br />At Sicily, even the Hermann Goering division, attacking with Tiger tanks and fairly well-trained troops, couldn't get through naval gunfire to throw the Americans back into the Gulf of Gela. I still think it is significant that no amphibious invasion save Wake Island was ever stopped cold, but the Normandy coast was in fact lower on the priority list for mines and fortifications than Calais. Given a few more months of prep time, one wonders how costly the landings might have been, or if it would have made a difference. M.Doroshhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09742262581616285671noreply@blogger.com